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An Indian perspective on 
megaregionals and 
concomitant trends
I am grateful for the opportunity to participate in this 
symposium and would like to congratulate the MegaReg team 
on their efforts to draw attention to a fascinating series of 
developments in international law, and the authors of the 
working papers on providing thoughtful commentaries to 
form the basis of these analyses.
In their papers, Professors Eyal Benvenisti and Richard B. 
Stewart draw out some common themes relating to the 
interactions between states in the negotiation and formation 
of international legal norms. One such theme is the 

diminished ability of more powerful states to set terms in 
larger multilateral fora. Another is the consequent movement 
of more powerful states to entrench norms of global import 
in smaller bilateral and regional fora. A third is the success of 
these efforts in defining baseline norms which then 
circumscribe the policy and negotiating positions of smaller, 
less powerful states in bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
These are powerful insights with great intuitive resonance. In 
this post I shall attempt to substantiate and explore these 
insights through factual examples from India, thereby 
meeting one of the goals of this symposium: to analyse the 
effect of mega-regionals on third-party developing countries, 
like India.
The difficulties of multilateral decision-making – India and 
the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement 
The magnified power of smaller states in multilateral 
negotiations and international organisations is sometimes 
linked to their ability to band together to resist pressures 
from more powerful states that might otherwise overwhelm 
them individually. The history of the UN General Assembly, 
for instance, is replete with many such examples. Another 
way in which small or mid-level states can amplify their 
voices in multilateral fora which rely on consensus-based 
decision-making is by playing spoiler to extract key 
concessions. An example of this strategy is the Indian 
approach to the negotiation of the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement where India was able to leverage its consent to 
the trade facilitation agreement to secure concessions on 
WTO commitments related to food security concerns. 
Arguably, this was not the wisest strategy (see, e.g., here, 
here and here) as it led to India being painted as 
obstructionist and damaged the institutional credibility of 
the WTO. It was, nonetheless, effective and suitably 
illustrates the concerns of more powerful states with regard 
to international organisations – particularly the difficulty of 
reaching consensus on contentious issues and the 
consequent ability of small groups of states to play spoiler.
The relative merits of bilateral engagement – India and IPR 
As the sheen of international organisations and multilateral 
negotiations fades, smaller negotiations with fewer 
participants may begin to seem more attractive. A fitting 
example of this in the Indian context is the debate over the 
global governance of intellectual property rights (IPR). 
Securing Indian commitment to the TRIPS standards was 
made feasible through the larger give and take involved in the 
establishment of the WTO. But as Benvenisti has noted, and 
as India has consistently argued, TRIPS standards and 
requirements permit considerable leeway for IPR policies and 
uses that countries like the USA would prefer to prevent. For 
many years the USA has tried to exert bilateral pressure on 
India to ‘reform’ its IPR policies, including through consistent 
castigation in the United States’ domestic Section 301 
processes. Almost equally consistently, India has asserted its 
commitment to exercising the full range of IPR rights 
available under TRIPS and its reluctance to accept TRIPS-
plus obligations – see, e.g., here, here, here, here, here and 
here. Recently, however, contradictory statements have 
begun to emerge from the Indian government, conceding 
alleged ‘weaknesses’ in Indian IPR laws, and revealing an 
openness to negotiation – see, e.g., here, here and here. At 
the same time, India’s participation in the US-led trade policy 
forum elicited praise from the USA (even as India remains on 
the priority watch list in the 2015 USTR special 301 report), 
and subsequently, the USTR (pg. 5) claimed that the “use of  
out-of-cycle review helped to secure commitments from India…
on a broad range of IP issues”.
To muddy these waters further, over the last two years, the 
Indian government has been engaged in an effort to 
articulate a national IPR policy – a process that has been 
plagued by concerns relating to the constitution and 
priorities of the committee tasked with drafting the policy. 
All of this points, troublingly, to a potential dilution of a 
traditionally strong Indian stand on IPR couched in terms of a 
legitimate defence of developing country interests. Even 
more worryingly, this policy shift seems to have been 
unilaterally engineered by the executive branch of the Indian 
government.
What has changed that makes India more amenable to 
cooperating with the USA on IPR issues? Arguably the answer 
lies in the current Indian government’s decision to seek 
closer relations with the United States, and to the American 
government’s ability to leverage Indian priorities in other 
areas into concessions on IPR issues. To the extent that the 
foregoing analysis is accurate, it provides a fitting example of 
the ability of more powerful states to press their interests in 
bilateral negotiations – a power that is deployed with greater 
efficiency and broader impact in mega-regionals like the TPP 
or NAFTA. (A full timeline of Indian IPR developments (on 
which the foregoing analysis is based) is available here.)
Universalizing norms through regional and bilateral 
engagement – India and ISDS 
It is possible to aggressively promote norms through bilateral 
and regional agreements to a point where the norms achieve 
near universality. A fitting example of this is investor-state 
arbitration which has now become ubiquitous in 
international trade and investment agreements. India 
entered into its first bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in 1994. 
Until 2010, it was successfully able to settle all investor-state 
arbitrations initiated against it, but in 2011 it faced its first 
adverse arbitration decision, in the White Industries case. 
Subsequently seven more cases have been initiated by 
foreign investors. The adverse decision in the White 
Industries case and the rash of subsequent arbitration 
challenges highlighted the vulnerability of the Indian state 
and its policies to this unique form of external challenge. 
Partly in response to this perceived threat, the Indian 
government decided to pause ratification of all pending 
investment treaties featuring investor-state dispute 
settlement mechanisms, and initiated an effort to revise the 
2003 Indian model BIT (para 1.7-1.8, here). The first draft of 
the revised model BIT, released in April 2015, constituted a 
rather radical departure from prevalent notions of 
investment protection.
For instance, the draft excluded the full protection and 
security, fair and equitable treatment and most-favoured 
national clauses that are usually found in such instruments 
and restricted the scope of the national treatment obligation 
to intentional and unlawful discrimination; it limited the 
scope of remedies against expropriation and circumscribed 
the scope of compensation available to investors; it restricted 
the definitions of investors and investment that would qualify 
for protection; taxation and intellectual property measures 
were exempted from challenge; and, investor protection was 
made contingent on compliance with Indian law including 
labour, human rights and anti-corruption laws, and wide 
scope was provided for host state counterclaims. The final 
draft of the model BIT, released in December 2015, though 
still ambitious, was markedly more conservative than its 
predecessor. Limited notions of full protection and security 
and fair and equitable treatment were introduced, the 
national treatment obligation and protections against 
expropriation were broadened, as were the definitions of 
investor and investment, the requirement to comply with 
Indian law was significantly restricted, and the availability of 
counterclaims was abandoned.
All in all, the final version of the model BIT represents a far 
more conventional and conservative notion of an investment 
treaty than the first draft, and arguably these changes find 
their genesis in prevailing investor-friendly ideas of 
investment arbitration which have been aggressively 
promoted as valuable norms. The changes between the initial 
and final drafts are explained in an analysis of the draft text 
by the Law Commission of India which justified its suggested 
changes on the basis of the need to protect the interests of 
Indian investors in foreign countries and to balance that with 
state’s regulatory discretion (e.g., para 1.12 and 2.1.4). Implicit 
in this analysis is the assumption that investors need or 
deserve special judicial remedies – an idea that has gained 
unquestioning acceptance through its repeated use and 
promotion in bilateral and regional treaties.
Through this post I have sought to expand on certain 
common themes running through Benvenisti’s and Stewart’s 
working papers and to illustrate them through India-specific 
examples. I cannot claim that these examples unambiguously 
support these ideas: each of them is certainly capable of 
alternative interpretations. However, contemporaneous 
analyses of international relations rarely allow for complete 
precision or for a lack of ambiguity. Correlation, though not 
causation, is at least correlation, and the coincidence of the 
events and examples outlined above with the broader trends 
represented by the mega-regionals should provide at least an 
indication of their possible impact on countries like India.
Abhimanyu George Jain works in London. His other papers can 
be found here. 
This post is part of our symposium “Megaregionals and the 
Others” that accompanies the ICONS conference at Humboldt 
University Berlin. Other symposium contributions can be 
found here.
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